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Morisset  devised  an analytical  framework  to  relatively  w2ak,  the indirect  effects  through
examine  the implications  of debt-reduction  domestic  assets are strong.
operations  for the economy  of a typical  middle-
income,  heavily indebted  country.  The prospect  of greater stability  in the
domestic  economy  increases  the demand  for
A major finding  is thar debt-reduction  domestic  assets,  particularly  bank deposits. This
policies  can succeed  io restoring  investment  and,  reduces  domestic  interest rates and increases  the
consequently,  growthfin  debtor  countries. Such  supply  of credit  extended  by the domestic
policies  combine  a liquidity  effect resulting  from  financial  sector. Both effects  have a positive
the reduction  in debt service  payments  and an  influence  on productive  invesunent.
incentive  effect resulting  from the debt relief.
,The  analysis  includes  a calculaton of the
A simulation  designed  to analyze  the effects  debt-reduction  and liquidity  combination  that
of debt-reduction  policies  in Argentina  showed  maximizes  Argentina's  GDP. The putpose was
that a 30 percent reduction  in debt had a 2.4  to determine  the best use of a potential  loan  to
percent  positive  effect on the level of (DP  in the  the  country  from intemnational  financial  institu--
first year and a 5.4 percent effect in the fifth  'tions.
year.
The empirical  results suggest  the tentative
The model  identifies  various  channels  conclusion  that a Brady Initiative  debt  and debt
through which  a reduction  in foreign  debt  service  reduction  operation  could establish  the
influences  investment.  Although  the  direct  basis for sustainable  growth  in ArgenIna, if
effect of debt relief on private  investment  is  combined  with appropri?te  domesticpoliciea.
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Introduction
Since  1982,  public  and  private  investment  rates  have  declined
dramatically  in  moss debtor  countries.  For  the  group  of 15  heavily  indebted
countries,  the  investment  to GDP  ratio  dropped  on average  by 6%  between  1971-
81 and 1982-88  when,  for  non-crisis  countries,  this  ratio  increased  in  average
by 15%2.  On the  basis  of this  empirical  evidence,  the  poor investment  and,
consequently,  growth  performance  in  highly  indebted  countries  is frequently
attributed,  at least  to some  extent,  to the  burden  of their  foreign  debt.
Basically,  the  decline  in  public  investment  is  explained  through  the
cutoff  in  external  financing.  The  public  debt-service  payments  could  not be
financed  by any  new foreign  borrowing  so that  adjustment  efforts  were
concentrated  on public  investment.  Easterly  (1989)  emphasizes  "the  adjustment
burden  in the  crisis  countries  was on the  public  expenditure  side.  Capital
spending  was the  most severely  cut,  falling  sharply  in  Argentina,  Brazil,
Mexico,  Morocco,  and the  Philippines".  Furthermore,  the  public  sector
situation  worsened,  since  the  governments  of debtor  countries  often  felt
compelled  to assume  external  liabilities  of the  private  sector.  In order  to
explain  the sharp  reduction  in private  investment,  the  recent  economic
literature  has identified  several  direct  and  indirect  channels.  If the  private
sector  has  been also  credit  rationed,  most authors  argued  that  a large  foreign
debt  affects  productive  investment  through  a disincentive  effect 3. Since  the
government  in  most debtor  countries  appeared  unable  (or  unwilling)  to  meet its
increasing  debt-service  payments,  private  investors  anticipated  higher  rates
of taxation  on real  and financial  assets  as well as  more instability  in the
economic  environment.  These  changes  affected  private  investment  negatively
through  the  debt-overhang  effect,  which  refers  to the  reduced  incentives  to
invest.  In  addition,  as foreign  assets  became  more attractive  relative  to
domestic  assets,  this  often  led  to an increase  in domestic  interest  rates,
reducing  private  investment  further.
An impressive  number  of theoretical  papers  has  been carried  out  during
recent  years  in  order  to challenge  or to assess  the  validity  of the  debt
overhang  hypothesis'.  There  has been,  however,  relatively  few  attempts  to
rest  empirically  this  hypothesis.  The  purpose  of this  paper  is to confront  the
actual  strategy  - debt-reduction  - with a  macroeconomic  and  dynamic  framework
that integrates  the  liquidity  and incentive  effects.  The  use  of a simultaneous
equations  model  allows  to take  into  account  various  direct  and indirect
2Source  :  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook,  supplementary  note 1, 1989.
3A disincentive  effect  may also  influence  public  investment.  For
instance,  a large  external  debt  might  discourage  the  government  adjustment
efforts,  since  much  or the  benefit  of adjustment  will  go to the  creditors.  We
consider,  however,  that  the  credit  rationing  effect  is stronger  than  the
disincentive  effect  on public  investment.
4see  for  example  Sachs  (1989),  Krugman  (1988),  Corden  (1989)  or Diwan
'1990).4
relationships  between  external  debt,  investment  and  economic  growth.  Our
assumption  ib  that the  impact  of a redrction  in external  debt  on growth
results  from  the interactions  of a number  of mechanisms  which  are likely  to
remain  unexplained  if single-equation  approaches  are  used 5. More  broadly,  the
paper  can  be viewed  as an attempt  to examine  if the  instruments  proposed  in
the Bzady  Plan  are  able to  restore  growth  in debtor  countries.
While  the  resilting  model  is  estimated  and simulated  for  Argentina,  it
might  be applied  to other  indebted  countries  as well.  Simulation  results
indicate  that investment  and,  consequently,  growth  are quite  responsive  to
debt-reduction  programs. As a matter  of fact,  debt-reduction  operations
produce  not only  a liquidity  effect  on public  investment  through  the  debt-
service  reduction  but  also  an incentive  effect  on private  investment  through
the  reduction  in  the stock  of external  debt.  It appears  that  this  result  is
not due  to the  direct  impact  of debt reductio;.  -n  private  investment,  but
rather  to the  portfolio  incentive  shift  from  foreign  assets  into  domestic
assets  which  reduces  domestic  interest  rates.  The  presence  of strong  potential
incentive  effects  is  encouraging  because  the  liquidity  effect  will be limited
in  countries  like  Argentina  which  are  running  arrears  and  are  unlikely  to
obtain  any  new foreign  lending  in the  short-run.
The  paper  proceed  as follows.  The  model  to be estimated  is described  in
section  1. Section  2 presents  the  estimation  procedure  and  the estimation
results  for  the  case  of  Argentina.  Also,  some  simulation  results  are  presented
and discussed.  In section  3,  assuming  that  the International  Financial
Institutions  make available  some loans  to  Argentina  for  debt-reduction,  we
attempt  to determine  empirically  the  debt  reduction-new  liquidity  combin-ition
which  fits  the  best  with the  preferences  of the  debtor  country.  Finally,
section  4 contains  our  conclusions.
1. SPECIFICATION  OF THE  MODEL
The  notation  and  the  complete  list  of  variables  and  equations
constituting  the  model  are  shown  in  Appendix  1. The  main features  of the  model
can  be summarized  as following.  First,  it  represents  a stylized  three  sectors
model  (private,  public  and  financial  (banking)  sectors)  for  a small  open
economy.  Second,  it attempts  to include  the  most important  characteristics  of
highly  indebted  countries  :  high inflation,  large  fiscal  deficits,  massive
capital  flight,  huge external  debt,  high debt  service  and  a relatively
developed  banking  sector.  Third,  as a clear  consensus  has emerged  in  recent
years  that  domestic  credit  is rationed  in LDCs  (see  Van  Wijnbergen  (1983),
5For  some  single-equation  estimations  of the  private  investment  equation,
see  for  example  Cohen  (1989),  Serven  and  Solimano  (1990),  de Melo  and Faini
(1989)  or Hofman  and  Reisen  (1989).  To  our  knowledge,  only  Borenzstein  (1990),
Dooley  et al. (1990)  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989,1990)  used  a simultaneous
equations  framework.5
Blejer  and  Khan (1984)  or Fry (1988))6  and that  unrestricted  access  to
international  markets  is  hardly  a relevant  case  for  most  LDC  borrowers,  it
assumes  that the  principal  constraint  on private  agent's  decisions  is  the
quantity  rather  than  the  -ost  of external  and internal  resources7.  Finally,
it  attem?ts  to reconcile  -he  Tobin-Sidrauski  approach  with the  McKinnon-Shaw
argumente  in the  sense  that  the  contribution  of money  to economic  growth  can
be positive  or negative  according  to its  relationship  with  productive  capital.
1.1  the  private  sector
As a starting  point,  we consider  the  following  real  budget  constraint
for  the  private  sector  :
(1)  yd  +  (OLp  + eOD$p)/P  - cp  + ip  + (LM1  + OV  +  OB  +  eOJ$)/P
The  private  sector  can  accumulate  assets  into  five  cowpo:ients  :  national
liquidities  (OMl),  bank deposits  (OV),  capital  goods (ip),  public  bonds (OB)
and  foreign  assets  (eOJ$).  Equation  (1)  states  that  private  expenditure  for
net accumulation  of assets  is constrained  by the  amount  of private  savings  (Yd
- cr),  the  changes  in  net domestic  credit  to the  private  sector  extended  by
the  banking  system  (OLp)  and  the  changes  in  gross  private  external  debt
(eOD$p).
The  real  private  disposable  income  (Yd)  is  defined  to be GDP  plus the
earnings  on domestic  and foreign  assets,  minus  interest  paid on external  and
internal  debt  and  net  taxes.
(2)  Yd  Y - t + (i,  - W)(V  1/P) + (ib  - ir)(B- 1/P) + (if  - X  - e^)(eJ-i/P)  -
(i,  - r)(L.rI/P)  - fdsp
where  fdsp  is,  on  a  cash  flow  basis,  the  foreign  debt  service  paid  by the
private  sector.
The desired  real  demands  for  money,  bank  deposits,  capital,  and  public
bonds  and  the  consumption  function  can  be specified  by a standard  integrated
portfolio  model :
(.)  C*p  =  a10 +  allYd  +  a1 2ir  '4  Ol3im  +  al1ib  +  ac5eD$/P
6Note  that  the  rationing  in  LDCs is justified  as a disequilibrium
phenomenon  caused  by legal  ceilings  on interest  rates.  By contrast,  for
developed  countries,  the  argument  is  based  on modern  theories  of imperfect
information  (see  Blinder  (1987)  or Stiglitz  (1988).
7Under  rationing,  the shadow  price  of the  capital  is  higher  than interest
rates  and  the  quantity  constraints  faced  by an agent  become  therefore
arguments  in  its  behavior.6
(4)  Ml* '  20  +  a2lYd +  C221r  +  023im  +  024ib  +  a 2 5eD$/P
(S)  V  - 030 +  *31Yd  +  @ 32 a  +  033im  +  034ib  +  C 35eD8/P
(6)  u  *40  +  °  Yd  +  o4 2 wr  +  a43im  + 044ib  +  C1 45eD8/P
(7)  k*p - 050  +  0slYd  +  a521r  +  a53im  +  054ib  +  c 55eDS/P
The demand  functions  (4)-(5)-(6)-(7)  and  the  consumption  function  (3)
are  based  on the  theoretical  arguments  proposed  by Brainard-Tobin  (1968)  and
Purvis  (1978).  These  authors  suggested  that  desired  demands  for  goods  and
assets  depend  essentially  on the  level  of disposable  income  and the  rates  of
return  on alternative  assets.  We defined  the  return  on bank  deposits  and
public  bonds  respectively  as the  nominal  interest  rate  on deposits  (im)  and
the  nominal  interest  rate  on government  bonds  (ib).  We admitted  that  the
demand  for  capital  goods  is  positively  correlated  with  the inflation  rate (it)
as argued  by Tobin (1965)  and  Fischer  (1979).  Asstming  that  economic  agents
refer  to domestic  conditions  rather  than  to foreign  real interest  rates,  we
defined  the  expected  rate  of return  on foreign  assets  only  with the  rate  of
inflation 8.
We introduced  the stock  of total  foreign  debt (eD$/P)  into  assets
demands  and consumption  function  to account  for  the  debt  overhang
hypothesisg.  At least  five  different  arguments  have  been  proposed  in  the
recent  literature  on international  debt in  order  to justify  the  relationship
between  the  stock  of foreign  debt  and  the  private  sector  portfolio  behavior.
(i)  As households  see  foreign  debt  increase,  they  may  well anticipate
increased  future  tax  burdens  for  its  servicing  and, therefore,  they  will  have
an increasing  incentive  to transfer  assets  abroad  or to consume  (Sachs
(1989)).
(it)  An increase  in  the  stock  of debt  increases  the  instability  of the
economy  which  affects  negatively  private  investment  and  domestic  assets
demands  (Serven  and  Solimano  (1990)).
(iii)  The  private  sector  can  perceive  that  a high stock  of debt  may
"goad  the  government  into  stimulating  exports,  wiAch  would  involve  a
devaluation  in the  real  exchange  rate",  thereby  increasing  capital  flight  (Fry
(1989)).
8This  simplification  implies  that  the  rate  of domestic  inflation  is  a
good indicator  of the  rate  of depreciation  of the  local  currency  and  that
variations  in  dumestic  inflation  are  larger  than  in foreign  interest  rates.
9For  example  Fry  (1988),  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989),  Cohen  (1989),  Borensztein
(1990),  Serven  and  Solimano  (1990)  or Greene  and  Villanueva  (1990)  used  this
procedure  to estimate  LDC  investment  functions  in  recent  papers.  Fry (1989)
and  Hofman  and  Reisen  (1989)  introduced  the  debt stock  into  the  consumption
(savings)  function  and  Cuddington  (1988)  into  the  capital  flight  function.
Note that in  the  empirical  part  of the  paper,  alternative  debt  overhang
indicators  will be tested.7
(iv)  When the  debt-service  payment  is linked  to the  economic  performance
of the  debtor  country,  this  creates  a discentive  effect  to  invest  or
accumu.ate  domestic  assets  because  much  of the  benefit  of adjustment  will  go
the  creditors  (Krugman  (1988:,.
(v)  An increase  in  external  debt stock  could  affect  negatively  the
demand  for domestic  assets  becelse  the  expected  return  on foreign  and  domestic
debt  may  be highly  correlated  isee  Dooley  (1990)  . d Borenzstein  (1990)).  For
example,  the  debt  overhang  would  generate  a premila  on the  return  on public
bonds  since  the  government  may  more likely  repay  loreign  creditors  than
domestic  creditors.
The expected  signs  for  the  parameters  of equations  (3)-(7)  are
summarized  in Table  1.
Assume  now that the  actual  consumption  and the  actual  asset  demands  do
not  adjust  immediately  toward  its  desired  level  as a result  of adjustment
costs :
(8)  cp - cp  l  e ol(c*p  - cP  l)
(9)  Oml = o2(ml* - ml 1)
(10)  OV - 03(V* - V-1)
(11)  Ob  =  o4(b* - b.1)
(12)  Okp =  U5 (k*p  - kp-l)
In  order  to take into  account  the  existence  of liquidity  constraints  on
portfolio's  decisions,  the speed  of adjustment  (o) between  desired  and  actual
demands  is  assumed  to  vary systematically  with the  variation  in  bank  credit  to
the  private  sector  and in  gross  private  external  debt 10. To illustrate  this
relationship,  a linear  representation  of the  speed  of adjustment  between
desired  and actual  demands  for  money  would  be
(13) a2 a  PA  +  [A^b  LpP  + p2eOD$ 3 /P]/(m1*  - ml-,)
with  pi  2 0  i-l,2
This equation  states  that  the  speed  of adjustment  is influenced
positively  by the  total  financing  available  to the  private  sector  measured  in
relative  terms  with respect  to the  size  of the  discrepancy  between  desired  and
actual  demands.
Finally,  substituting  equation  (13)  into  equations  (8)-(9)-(10)-(l1)-
10This  procedure  has  been  used  for the  investmer,t  function  by Coen
(1971),  Blejer  and  Khan (1984)  and  Sundarajan  (1986).8
(12),  we can  write  the  following  functions 11 :
(14)  cp  =  o10  +  Allyd  +  £1 2ir  +  k131m  +  %14
1 b  +  £15(eD$/P)  £16(ULp/P)  +
A17(eOD$p/P)  + ILBCp-l
(15)  emld  =  20  +  121Yd  +  £227  +  £23im  +  k24ib  +  £25(eD$/P)  +  926OLP/P)+
'27 (eOD$ p/P)  +  £2 8 ml1X
(16)  OVd  D  30  +  £31yd  +  £3 2 r  +  £3 3im  +  £34ib  +  £ 35(eD$/P) +  936(Up/P)  +
937(ebD$/P)  +  A38v  1
(175  Obd  £40  +  %41Yd +  £4 27r +  £4 3im  +  £44ib  +  £ 45(eD$/P)  +  £46 (I0LP/P)  +
A 4 7(e0D$P/P)  +  £48b- 1
(18)  ip  '  £50  +  451Yd  +  s 5 2ir  +  £5 3im  +  £54ib  +  £55(eD$/P)  +  1 56(bLp/P)  +
95 7(eLD$,/P)  +  £58kp-.1
In  view  of  the  budget  constraint  (1),  it is  clear  that  the  demand  for
foreign  assets  (eOJ 3/P) is  determined  as well.  Once  an agent  has determined
his  holdings  of any  four  assets  given  the  level  of resources  available  tc  him,
his  demand  for  the  fifth  asset  has  been  also  defined.
1.2  the  banking  sector  and  external  sector
The framework  (l)-(18)  is  similar  to the  one  proposed  by Tobin-Sidrauski
in  the sense  that  money (Lml  and  Ov)  and  real  capital  are  substitutes  rather
than  complements.  As a  matter  of fact,  an increase  in the  demand  for  bank
deposits  following  high real  interest  rates  should  lead  to a reduction  in
investment.  This portfolio  shift  represents  the  larger  attractiveness  of
holding  deposits  than  productive  capital.  However,  this  approach  fails  to take
into  account  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis  which  assumes  a positive
relationship  between  the  demand  for  money  and the  demand  for  Capital
accumulation  via the  domestic  credit  to the  private  sector  extended  by the
banking  system.  This positive  link  between  money  and real  investment:  may  be
introduced  into  the  model  through  the  budget  constraint  of the  financial
sector 12 .
The  banking  system,  which  is assumed  for  simplification  to integrate  the
"Note that ip  - Okp  - 6kp-
12Introducing  the  budget  constraint  of the  banking  sector  into  the system
(l)-(18),  we could  reconcile  the  Tobin-Sidrauski  arguments  -.- d the  McKinnon-
Shaw  hypothesis.  A variation  (say  an increase)  in  the  real interest  rates
changes,  on one  hand,  the  asset  portfolio,  as assetsholders  move  out  of real
investment  and foreign  assets  into  national  liquidities.  On the  other  hand,
the  rise in  money  demand  increases  the supply  of domestic  credits  to the
private  sector  and,  hence,  private  investment  since  this  sector  is assuned  to
be liquidity  constrained  (see  Morisset  (1990).central  bank 'nd  commercial  banks,  accumulates  international  reserves  (eOR$)
(which  are  determined  enuogenously  by the  balance  of payments  (see  below)),
extends  credits  to the  government  (OL 8 )  and to the  private  sector  (MLp)  and
issues  liabilities  in  the  form  of money  (OMI 8) and deposits  (6V 8 )
(19)  OLp  -QMI +  OVO - eORS  - OL8  - (im  - f)V.l  +  (il  - )Ll  +  (if  - ir  -
The constraint  (19)  indicates  that  a rise in  money  supply  must cause,
ceteris  paribus,  an increase  in  the  suppl-  of credit  to the  privat.  sector,
because  domestic  credit  is  the  primary  asset  backing  the  monetary  Liabilities
of the  banking  system.  Note that  an increase  in  government  borrowing  simply
subtracts  credit  to the  private  sector.  This  presentation  also  emphasizes  that
the  amount  of credits  to the  public  sector  is  nc. directly  controlled  by the
financial  sector.  In  most developing  countries,  the  amount  of credit  to the
public  sector  is determined  by the  demand  of the  government  rather  than  the
supply  of *>-e  financial  system  (Easterly  (1989)).
Assuming  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime 13, the  changes  in international
reserves  are determined  by the  balance  of  payments  identity  :
(20)  eOR$  - [eOD$p  +  eOD$,  +  FDI - eOJ$]  +  [x  - im - fdsp  - fdsg
+  (it  - 1  - e')eR 8
1J
where  the first  and second  terms  in  parenthesis  are  the  capital  account  and
the  current  account  respectively.  The  variables  fdsp  and  fdsg  are, on a cash
flow  basis,  the  actual  interests  on foreign  debt  paid  by the  private  and
public  sectors,  x exports,  im imports  and  FDI  net foreign  direct  investment.
Exports  are supposed  to  be a function  c  }DP,  the  real exchange  rate
(eP*/t),  the stock  of capital  held in  beginning  of period  (k-l)  and the  level
of foreign  GDP (y*),  with  positive  coefficients  for  all  variables.  Imports  are
related  negatively  to the  real exchange  rate  and  positively  to domestic
output.  To incorporate  partial  adjustment,  a lagged  dependant  variable  is
included  in  both  equations.  The  exports  and imports  equations  can  therefore  be
expressed  as 14:
(21)  x - %0  +  e1(eP*/P)  +  92y*  +  e3k- 1 + 94x-1
(22)  im - t  +  4Z 1 (eP*/P)  +  42Y  +  t3im- 1
Actual  interest  paid  on foreign  debt (fdsp  and fdsg)  is  assumed  to be
exogenous.  In the  present  situation,  the  change  in  foreign  debt-service
payments  is  more likely  determined  by direct  negotiations  with  commercial
13Alternatively  ,  the  balance  of payments  identity  can  be  b_ed to
determine  the  nominal  exchange  rate (flexible  exchange  rate  regime).
14see  Haque,  Lahiri  and  Montiel  (1990),  for  such  specification.10
banks,  exogenous  to this  system,  than  domeatic  variables.  Note,  however,  that
foreign  debt-service  payments  can  become  linked  to ths  economic  performance  of
the  debtor  country  as nesult  of the  negotiations.  In this  case,  the  debt-
service  payments  can  be a  fraction  of GDP (or  exports)  with  the consequence
that  a part of any increase  in  production  would  In  fact  be devoted  to the
debt-servicing 15. This  can increase  the  liquidity  constraint  of the  debtor
economy  and  reduces  the initial  positive  impact  on investment  and,
consequently,  growth.
Given  that  many indebted  courntries  currently  runs  arrears,  the
distinction  between  the  contractual  and  cash  flow  external  debt-service  should
be clear.  We defined  the  difference  between  the  co.itractual  foreign  debt-
service  (fds*)  and  the  debt-service  currently  paid  by the  private  (fdsp)  and
public  (fds 5) sectors  as arrears  :
(23)  arrears  - (fdsp*  +  fds,*)  - (fdsp  +  fdsg)
Assuming  that  the  money  market  clears  within  the  time  period  under
consideration,  inflation  can  be explained  by the  rate  of change  in  nominal
money  supply  and the  determinants  of "he  rate  of change  in  real  money  demand.
The  equilibrium  condition  in  the  money  market  (Ml)  can  be expres-ed
(24)  Ml/p _ mld
where  Ml'  is  nominal  money  supply,  mld  real  money  demand  (in  stock  term)  a;id  P
the  price  level.  Equation  (24)  can  be riwritten  in first  difference
logarithmic  form  :
(25)  ir  - p  - Omld/ml
where  ,r  - OlnP;  p  - Oln(Mls)  and  omld/ml  - Oln(ml)
As the  money  market,  the  bank  deposi.s  market  is assumed  to be in
equilibrium  :
(26)  Vs/P  - vd
The interest  rate  on deposits  is determined  by equation  (26).  Note,
however,  that  the  authorities  often  choosed  to fixe  legal  ceilir.gs  on domestic
interest  rates (see  Fry (1988)). With i,  exogenous,  equation  (26)  becomes
unnecessary  since  the  quantity  of money  is only  determined  by the  deposits
demand  of the  private  sector  (equation  (16)).  Alternatively,  the  supply  of
15As  Borenzstein  (1990b),  we will  assur-  that  this  fraction  is  fixed  and
exogenously  determined.  This  approch  does  noc take  into  account  the
possibility  that the  debtor  country  can  manipulate  its  production  level  in
order  to  modify  its  bargaining  position  vis-a-vis  the  creditors,  as in
Aizenman  and  Borenzstein  (1989).  In fact,  it is  very  unlikely  that  a country
will  voluntary  reduce  its  production  level  to  negotiate  the  debt-service
repayment  (see  Polak  (1989).ii
deposits  (V8)  can  be exogenous.  In this  case,  the inte  est  rate on deposits  is
determined  endogenously  by equation  (26).
1.3  the  public  sector
The budget  constraint  of the  public  sector  can  be expressed  as:
(27)  bL 8/P  i  ig + g +  (ib - 7r)B../P  + fds 5 + (il  - ir)L,- 1/P  - t - OB-/P  -
The  public  sector  can finance  its  expenditures  which  consist  of
purchases  of domestic  goods  for  investment  (i 8) and  consumption  (g)  purposes
and interest  payments  on domestic  and foreign  debt  through  taxes  (t),  sales  of
public  bonds  to the private  sector  (OB 8), bozrowing  from  the  domestic  banking
system  (OL 8) or/and  external  debt (eOD$,).
The experience  of the last  decade  indicates  that  most debt-crisis
countries  h&ve relied  on cutback  in  public  investment.  That is  why public
investment  is  assumed  to be the  adjusting  variable  of the  government
constraint  in the  majority  of recent  papers  (e.g.  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989)).  In
order  to introduce  some  flexibility  into  the  model,  we assume  I-stead  that
public  investment  and  credits  from  the  central  bank to the  govelaaent  are  both
endogenous.  This  results  from  the  observation  that  recent  adjustment  programs
emphasize  the  reduction  of fiscal  deficit  in  highly  indebted  countries  so that
these  governments  are limited  to  raise  their  spending  even for  investment
purposes.
The  credits  from the  central  bank  are  determined  by the  budget
constraint  of the  public  sector 16 (equation  (27))  and  public  investment  is
specified  as :
(28)  i8 a  rO  +  1l(ibB_l/P)  +  72(fds 8 )  +  T 3(eOD$8/P)  +  74y1 +  F5iB
where rl,2  <  0  and  73, r4  >  0
Equation  (28)  is  based  on the  arguments  proposed  by Heller  (1975),
Mosley  (1936)  and  Nam (1990)  which  suggested  that the  composition  of revenue
sources  and  expenditures  has  an impact  on government  consumption/investment
behavior.  Of particular  interest  is  how  the  availability  of net foreign
borrowing  affects  public  investment.  We assume  that  public  investment  is
16This  presentation  emphasizes  that  most LDC  governments  have financed
their  deficits  through  money  creation  when  they  cannot  use  other  sources  of
financing.  "Although  LDC  government  could  conceivably  experiment  with
inflationary  finance  as if  were  an independently  variable,  it  would  generally
be more realistic  to treat  inflationary  additions  to the  money  supply  as a
consequence  of fiscal  disequilibrium  or of the inability  or unwillingness  to
finance  growth  of exhaustive  government  expenditures  through  explicit  taxes,
the  sale  of government  bonds  to the  private  sector  or external  borrowing"  (von
Furstenberg  (1983,  p.233)).12
influenced  positively  by an increase  in taxes,  which  are  correlated  positively
to lagged  GDP level,  and  in external  financing  and  negatively  by a rise in
interest  payments  on internal  and  external  debt.
The  public  bonds  market  is  assumed  to be in  equilibrium:
(29)  B8/P = bd
As in the  money  market,  the  authorities  can  administer  the  bonds  market
through  two  alternate  instruments  :  interest  rates  ceilings  and controls  on
the  flow supply  of bonds.  If either  the  nominal  interest  rate  on public  bonds
or the  flow supply  of  bonds is  treated  as an exogenous  variable,  the  other
becomes  endogenous.  With  rb exogenous,  the  authorities  choose  to fixe legal
ceilings  on domestic  interest  rates.  Equation  (29)  becomes  unnecessary  since
the  quantity  of bonds  is  only  determined  by the  bonds  demand  of the  private
sector  (equation  (17)).  Alternatively,  the  government  could  choose  OB 8
exogenously.  In this  case,  the interest  rate  on bonds  is  determined
endogenously  b, equation  (29).
1.4  remaining  equations
In  order  to analyze  the  relationship  between  external  debt  and  growth,
we consider  a Leontief  production  function:
(30)  yS  =  min[f(k),g(l)]
where  k is the  capititl  stock  at the  end  of  period  and  1 labor  utilized  during
the  period.
Under  the  assumption  that  capital  is the  limiting  factor,  we can  write:
(31)  ys  =  f(k)
In  order  to account  for  delivery  lags  in the  investment  process  and  for
adjustment  costs  associated  with  investment'7,  we assume  that  current
investment  does  not necessarily  turn  into  capital  within  the  current  period.
Increasing  investment,  holding  other  inputs  constant,  may  reduce  output  when
the  positive  contribution  to  production  (delayed  by delivery  lags)  is lower
than installation  costs.  Following  Shapiro  (1986),  the  linearized  equation  for
output  can  be  written
(32)  y5  - fo  +  1lip  +  nl2ig  +  O3 kp-1  +  +4kg-2
with  DO,  03 and  04  ;  0
n,  and  02 >  or  <  0
Because  the  characteristics  of the  public  and  private  sector  can  be
17see  Lucas  (1967).13
dLfferent,  we separated  public  and  private  investment  (ip  and iL)  and  public
and  private  stock  of capital  ln  equation  (32).  An increase  in  k-l  will  raise
the  level  of  production,  but  the impact  of a variation  in  current  private  and
public  investment  remains  ambiguous" 8.
Finally,  the  model's  dynamic  specification  is completed  with  a
description  of the  behavlor  of the  price  level,  the  stock  of money,  the  stock
of public  bonds,  the  stock  of capital  and  the  stock  of private  and  public
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(33)  P - (1  +  w)P- 1
(34)  M - M-1  +  OM
(35)  B  - B- 1 +  OB
(36)  k - (1  - 6)kp-l  +  (1 - 6)k 8 l  +  ip  +  is
(37)  eD$  - eD 8P1 +  eOD$p  +  eD$s-1  +  eODS 8
1.5  An overview  of the  model
In summary,  the  model  consists  on 8  behavioral  relationships  and 14
identities  (see  appendix  1).  The  analysis  incorporates  budget  constraints  and
portfolio  structure  of the  private,  financial  and  public  sectors  and  takes
into  account  various  interactions  between  these  three  sectors.  In addition,
the  relationshlp  between  capital  and  money  is explicitly  modeled  in  order  to
reconcile  the  arguments  of Tobin-Sidrauski  with  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis.
The  model  treats  the  relationship  between  nominal  and  real  variables  in  detail
and  the  dynamics  of the  model  derives  primarily  from the  assets  stocks
identity  and from  the  dependant  lagged  variables.  Note,  however,  that some
hypothesis  have  been  adopted  for  simplicity.  In  particular,  the  production
function  is  oversimplified  and  we do  not include  a parallel  exchange  rate  and
foreign  equity  markets.
Within  this  framework,  we address  the  critical  issue  of the  role  of
external  debt in  highly  indebted  countries.  The impact  of external  financing
policies  on domestic  variables  can  be illustrated  by considering  two  simple
examples: (i)  additional  financing  to the  private  sector  and (ii)  pure  public
debt-reduction.  In  order  to  keep the  description  as simple  as possible,  we
assume  that  interest  rates  are fixed  in  money  and  bonds  markets,  the  trade
balance  is  exogenous  and the  nominal  exchange  rate  is fixed.
The  transmission  of an increase  in  private  external  financing  into  the
18Using  annual  data,  the impact  of  a variation  in current  investment  on
the  level  of production  is  certainly  positive.  The  contribution  of the  new
capital  is  higher  than  the  costs  of adjustment.
19To  simplify,  we assume  that  there  is  no principal  repayments14
domestic  economy  can  be summarized  as follows
(a)  The increase  in external  financing  affects  assets  demands  and
private  consumption.  We can  distinguish  the  liquidity  and  the (dis)incentive
effects.  The  first  effect  increases  the  demands  for domestic  assets  and
consumption,  but  the second,  due  to the  rise in  future  debt,  implies  a shift
from investment,  public  bonds  and  bank deposits  into  consumption  and  capital
flight  (equations  (14)-(18)).
(b)  Higher  foreign  capital  inflow  increases  international  reserves,  but
this  can  be reduced  through  the  rise  in  capital  flight  (equation  (20)).
(c)  The  changes  in  assets  demands  and in international  reserves
influence  the supply  of credits  to the  private  sector  extended  by the  banking
sector  (equation  (19)).  If the  liquidity  effect  on bank deposits  is  higher
than  the  discentive  effect  (equation  (16)),  the  demand  for  bank deposits
increases.  As the effect  on international  reserves  is  ambiguous,  we can  assume
a rise in  the flow  of credits.
(d)  The  release  of the  liquidity  constraint  of the  private  sector
increases  domestic  assets  demands  and  private  consumption  further.  Higher
demand  for  public  bonds  leads  to  a reduction  in  government  borrowing  from  the
central  bank (aquation  (27)),  thereby  increasing  domestic  credit  to the
private  sector  (equation  19)).
(e)  The short-term  impact  on the  level  of production  depends  on the
variation  in  private  investment  (equation  (30)).  This  variable  may increase
due  to the  release  of the  liquidity  constraint,  but it  may  be reduced  through
the  debt-overhang  effect.  Let  us assume  at this  level  of the  presentation  that
the  total  effect  on investment  and  growth  is  positive.
The  transmission  of a reduction  in the  stock  of public  external  debt (at
the  beginning  of period)  through  debt  forgiveness  into  the domestic  economy
can  be summarized  as follows:
(a)  The  reduction  in  public  external  debt-service  payments  relaxes  the
government  budget  constraint  which  leads  to  an increase  in  public  investment
(equation  (26))  and  a decline  in  borrowing  from  the  central  bank (equation
(27)).
(b)  The  reduction  in  public-debt  service  implies  an increase  in
international  reserves  through  the  external  constraint  (equation  (20)).
(c)  The decline  in the  stock  of  public  debt  leads  to a change  in the
portfolio  of the  private  sector  through  the  incentive  effect  (equation  (14)-
(18)).  This  effect  influences  positively  the  demand  for  private  investment  and
for  domestic  assets  and  negatively  the  demand  for  foreign  assets  and
consumption.
(d)  The increase  in  bank deposits  and  public  bonds  and  the  reduction  in
domestic  credits  to the  government  affect  positively  the  flow  supply  of
domestic  credits  to the  private  sector  (equation  (19)).  In spite  of higher
international  reserves  which  reduce  the  supply  of domestic  credits,  the
resulting  change  in domestic  credit  is certainly  positive.
(e)  Higher  domestic  credit  relaxes  the  liquidity  constraint  of the
private  sector  and  raise  the  demand  for  domestic  assets,  consumption  and
investment  further.
(f)  Higher  public  investment  and  higher  private  investment  increase  the
level  of production  (equation  (30)).
Table  2 summarizes  the  expected  effect  of a simple  public  external  debt-15
reduction  and  an increase  in  foreign  capital  inflow  to the  private  sector  on
the  main endogenous  variables  of the  model.  The  effects  of debt-reduction  are
probably  an underestimate  of the  full impact,  because  the  improvement  in
country  risk  considerations  would  help  attract  additional  foreign  financing
and  lead  to a return  of capital  flight 20.
2.  AN EMPIRICAL  TEST :  ARGENTINA  (1962-86)
The  model  developed  in the  last  section  could  be used in  principle  to
examine  the direct  and  total  effects  of a  variety  of policies  on private
investment  and  other  endogenous  variables  of the  model.  By estimating  the
model  for  Argentina  and  by stimulating  it,  the  response  of key  variables  to
changes  in  foreign  debt  levels  will be derived  for  this  country.
2.1  Data  and estimation  results
The  data  have been  obtained  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund's
International  Financial  Statistics,  the  World  Bank's  reports  on Argentina
(1985  and 1990),  Fundaccion  Mediterranea  (1984),  the  Central  Bank  of Argentina
and  Dornbusch  and de Pablo  (1988).  All series  are  described  in  Appendix  1.
The  general  framework  presented  in section  1  was slightly  altered  to
reflect  the  lack  of data  of certain  variables  and  some  important
characteristics  of the  Argentinean  economy.  First  at all,  we were  not  able  to
use  a consistency  approach  to  measure  the  economic  agents  budget  constraints
over  the  estimation  period.  Second,  because  data  on public  bonds  in  hands  of
the  private  sector  was  not available  over  a long  period  of time,  we assumed
that  the  private  sector  agents  do  not  hold  public  bonds in  their  portfolios.
This simplification  does  not appear  excessive  in the  case  of Argentina  since,
practically,  all  public  bonds  issued  by the  public  sector  were directly  held
by commercial  banks  in  recent  years.  The  modified  budget  constraints  of the
financial  sector  and the  private  sector  are  presented  in  Appendix  2. Third,  we
assume  that  the interest  rate  on public  bonds  is  determined  by the  interest  on
bank  deposits  since  deposit  and  public  bonds  markets  are  viewed  as competitive
in a country  like  Argentina 2l. In other  words,  these  two  assets  are  assumed
to be perfect  substitutes.
Also,  we modified  the  estimated  inflation  equation  to account  for  the
influence  of both international  price  arbitrage  and domestic  factors.  The
estimation  procedure  has  been to substitute  money  demand  equation  (equation
(15))  into  the inflation  function  (equation  (25))  and,  then,  to introduce
external  factors  into  the  resulting  equation.  The  presence  of both
international  inflation  rate  and  monetary  disequilibrium  effects  arises
because  the  Argentinean  economy  was  neither  completely  closed  nor opened  over
20The model  assumes  only  a reversal  of capital  flight.
21see  Santomero  and  Langohr  (1986)  for  further  explanations  on this
simplification.16
the  last 30  years (see  Mathieson  (1982)).  Finally,  the  most general
specification  was first  estimated,  and  then  by dropping  insignificant
variables,  the equation  that  yield  the  higher  explanatory  power (R 2) was
chosen  for simulation.
Even if imports  were  affected  by domestic  activity  and  relative  prices
in  Argentina,  we assumed  that imports  are  exogenous  because  tariff  and
nontariff  protection  has been  the  most important  factor  which  influenced  the
variation  in imports  over the  1961-86  period.  The  variable  AY (agricultural
production  to total  production  ratio)  has  been introduced  into  the  exports
function  to capture  the impact  of shifts  in  climatic  conditions  on the  exports
performance  of Argentina.  We used  the  current  GDP to trend  GDP level  ratio
(Y/YT)  rather  than  disposable  income  (Yd)  as explanatory  variable  of the
private  investment  function.  As suggested  by Blejer  and  Khan (1984),  private
investors  are expected  to respond  more  rapidly  to changes  in  private
investment  when demand  conditions  are  buoyant.  In the  production  function,
since  there  is  no data  available  on the  private  and  the  public  stock  of
capital  we used the  total  stock.  Finally,  we introduced  dummy  variables  into
three  equations  of the  model.  The  variable  duml  represents  the liberalization
of interest  rates  from 1977  onward  and its  positive  impact  on the  demand  for
bank  deposits.  The  variable  dum2  reflects  price  controls  during  the  1973-75
period.  The  variable  dum3  captures  the large  premium  between  the  fixed
exchange  rate and  the  free  market  rate in 1974.  The  variable  dum4  reflects  the
political  and  economic  uncertainties  that  dominated  during  changes  in
government  in 1976  and  1983.  The  variable  dum5  represents  the  strong  increase
in  real  wages  during  the "Plan  Gelbard"  in 1974  and 1975  and the  variable  dUm6
reflects  the  negative  impact  of the  Falklands/Malvinas  war in 1982.
In Table  3  we report  estimates  for  Argentina  over  the 1962-86  period.  We
used three-stage  least  squares  for  all  equations,  except  for  the  exports  and
inflation  functions  which  were  estimated  by two-stage  least  squares  22 . On the
whole,  the  results  are  quite  satisfactory.  The  explanatory  power  (R 2) and  DW
statistics  are  both  acceptable,  suggesting  a good  specification  of the  model.
The  most interesting  aspects  of these  results  concern  the incentive  and
liquidity  effects  of external  debt  on domestic  variables.  Indeed,  the
estimated  coefficients  of the  stock  of debt (eD$/P)  appear  to be positive  on
consumption  (dcp/deD= 0.02)  and  capital  flight  (deOJ/deD$  - 0.190)  and
negative  on  private  investment  (dip/deD$  - -0.091)  and  bank deposits
(dOv/deD$  - -0.101).  These  empirical  results  validate  the  debt-overhang
arguments  presented  in  section  1. The  estimated  coefficient  of additional
foreign  resources  to the  public  sector  is  positive  on  public  investment
(dig/dOD 8g - 0.294)  and  the  impact  of an increase  in  public  foreign  debt-
service  is  negative  on public  investment  (di 8/dfds,  - -0.4807).  The effect  of
capital  inflow  to the  private  sector  seems  to  be positive  on consumption
(dcW/dOD 31  - 0.059)  and  the  demand  for  bank  deposits  (dOv/dDsp  - 0.639),  but
negative  on private  investment  (dip/dOD$p  - -0.466).  As equations  are  linearly
dependant,  we are  able  to deduct  that  an increase  in  private  foreign  debt  led
to capital  flight  during  the  1962-86  period  in  Argentina  (dOJ/dOD$p  - 0.768).
22We  report  in  Table  3  only the  estimations  results  that  have  been
selected  for  simulation.17
Even if  the  magnitude  of  the  negative  estimated  impact  of foreign  capital
inflow  on private  investment  seems  doubtful,  these  results  are  quite
compatible  with the  Argentine  experience.  An increase  in capital  inflow
appears  to finance  capital  flight  and  bank deposits  rather  than  private
investment  in  Argentina  (see  Morisset  (1989)).  Note,  however,  that  these
estimates  include  only  the  direct  effect  of variations  in foreign  debt
variables  and,  therefore,  they cannot  be interpreted  as the  total  effect  of
such  policies  (see  below  for further  explanations).
In regressions  presented  in  table  3,  we attempt  to capture  the  debt
overhang  using  as an indicator  the  total  stock  of external  debt  over  the 1962-
86 period.  But,  one  can  argue  that  the  disincentive  effect  of a large  stock  of
debt  may  be significant  only since  the  beginning  of the  debt crisis 23. In
order  to test  this  argument,  we reestimated  the  model  assuming  that  the  debt
overhang  did  not exist  before  1982.  In  equations  (12),  (14)  and (16)  we
introduced  a  multiplicative  dummy  variable  associated  to the stock  of external
debt that  takes  the  value  of unity  from 1982  onwards  and zero  in all  previous
years 24. On the  whole,  the  estimated  results  obtained  with this  alternative
measure  do  not appear  significantly  different  from those  presented  in  table  3.
As a matter  of fact,  the impact  of the  total  stock  of debt  measured  from 1982
is  positive  on  private  consumption  (dcp/deD6  = 0.035)  and  capital  flight
(deOJ/deD$  =  0.190)  and  negative  on private  investment  (dip/deD$  =  -0.087)
and  bank deposits  (dbv/deDs  = -0.072)25
The  results  pertaining  to the  other  variables  also  deserve  a brief
explanation.  The estimated  coefficient  of disposable  income  is  positive  on
consumption  and domestic  assets  demands.  In general,  the impact  of the
inflation  rate and  the  rate  of interest  corresponds  to  the  one  predicted  by
the theoretical  portfolio  analysis.  The  positive  relationship  between  domestic
credit  to the  private  sector  and  private  investment  and  the demand  for  bank
deposits  are compatible  with a priori  expectations  since  the  Argentine  private
sector  has  been liquidity  constrained.  Surprisingly,  the  coefficient  of OLp
appears  poorly  significant  on consumption.  The  estimation  of the  public
investment  function  and  exports  function  seems  to  be satisfactory  since  all
parameters  have the  expected  signs.  The  positive  impact  of the lagged  stock  of
capital  on exports  indicates  that  export  volumes  respond  to changes  in supply
conditions.  The inflation  rate is  correlated  positively  and  significantly  to
the  nominal  growth  of money.  In  addition,  external  factors  appear  to have
influenced  significantly  the inflation  process  in  Argentina.  The inflation
23see  for  example  Borenzstein  (1990)
24It  is important  to note  that  Fry (1989)  suggested  that  the  stock  of
debt  should  be introduced  into  these  functions  in  quadratic  form instead  of
linear  form  as it is  only  when debt is  superior  to a certain  level  that  it can
generate  a negative  incentive  effect.  But,  in the  case  of Argentina,  the
empirical  results  do  not  appear  satisfactory.  The  coefficient  of the  stock  of
debt squared  are  not significant  on  most of domestic  variables.
25On request,  all  results  can  be obtained  from  the  author.18
rate  responded  positively  to the  rate  of change  in foreign  prices  and to any
departure  of the  prices  to foreign  prices.  Finally,  the  production  level
appears  to be influenced  positively  by private  investment  and  negatively  by
public  investment.  This suggests  that  the  costs  of adjustment  are  more
important  in the  public  sector  than  in the  private  sector.  The  effect  of an
increase  in  the  total  stock  of capital  held in the  beginning  of period  is
positive  and significant  on the  production  level.
2.2  Goodness-of-fit
Historical  simulations  indicated  that  the  goodness-of-fit  of the  model
as a  whole is  quite  good for  Argentina  over the  1962-86  period.  Domestic
interest  rates  and the  nominal  exchange  rate  are  assumed  to be fixed  since  the
government  controlled  these  variables  during  most  of years  of the simulation
period.  Note that  we will  reverse  this  assumption  in the  following  section.
Table  4 provides  the  correlation  coefficient  between  historic  and simulated
series  and  Theil's  inequality  coefficient  for  the  most important  endogenous
variables.  Even if these  coefficients  indicate  that  the  small  structural  model
is  stable  and  are indicative  of its  robustness,  needless  to say, that  our
simulation  results  have to  be viewed  with some  care.  Actually,  they are
intended  primary  as an illustration  of the  relationship  between  external  debt,
investment  and  growth  and  not as perfect  representation  of the  Argentine
economy.
2.3  Total  effect  of debt  reduction  and capital  inflow  on domestic  variables
The  model  can  be used as  basis  for  deriving  the  short-run  (1 year)  and
medium-run  (5  years)  total  response  of domestic  variables  to external  debt
policies.  Since  the  model  is  almost  linear,  the  simulation  results  do  not
depend  strongly  of the  starting  conditions  and,  moreover,  they  are  not very
dependant  of the  absolute  size  of the  shock.  In  Table  5  we report  the
deviation  from  the  baseline  (in  terms  of elasticity)  of the  main endogenous
variables  of the  model  to a one  percentage  point  decrease  in  external  stock  or
one  percentage  point  increase  in  capital  inflow 26. More  precisely,  we
distinguished  the  effects  of four  different  policies  :
(i)  A one  percent  debt  write-off  without  change  in  the  debt-service  paid
by the  public  sector,
(ii)  A one  percent  debt  write-off  with  a one  percent  reduction  in the
debt-service  paid  by the  public  sector,
(iii)  A one  percent  increase  in  external  financing  to the  private
sector
and (iv)  a one  percent  increase  in external  financing  to the  public
sector.
26Note  that,  by contrast  to  historical  simulations,  interest  rates  are
not  assumed  to be fixed  by authorities  in  these  simulations.19
In order  to identify  the  debt  overhang  effect,  a debt-reduction
operation  is first  computed  by ignoring  the liquidity  effect  which  may arise
from  the  public  debt-service  reduction.  This liquidity  effect  will  be, anyway,
limited  in countries  which  are  running  arrears.  The short-term  and  medium-term
simulation  results  indicate  that  the  real  private  investment  is significantly
responsive  to external  debt  changes.  To illustrate,  an initial  20%  debt-
reduction  leads  to an increase  in  private  investment  and in the  GDP  level  of
11.7  %  and 1.16%  respectively  (5  years  impact).  More  precisely,  a debt-
reduction  will affect  positively  the  level  of private  investment  through  three
different  incentive  channels.  First,  as private  investors  see  the  foreign  debt
burden  decrease,  they  anticipate  reduced  future  tax  burden  for  its  servicing
and  more stability  of the  economy.  Second,  the  portfolio  shift  from  foreign
assets  into  domestic  bank  deposits  reduces  interest  rates.  Third,  the  banking
system  extends  more  domestic  credit  to the  private  investors  since  a reduction
in the  price  level  increases  real  money  supply 27. Note,  however,  that  the
increase  in international  reserves  reduces  simultaneously  the  flow  supply  of
domestic  credit.
The second  shock  assumes  not  only  an incentive  effect  but  also a
liquidity  effect.  The incentive  effect  is  similar  to the  one described  in  the
first  policy  and  the  liquidity  effect  arises  from the  reduction  in the  foreign
debt  service  paid  by the  public  sector 28. The release  of the  budget
constraint  of the  public  sector  leads  simultaneously  to  an increase  in  public
investment  and  a reduction  in  public  borrowing  from  the  domestic  financial
system,  therefore  lowering  the  crowding  out  of domestic  credit  to the  private
sector.  Higher  domestic  credit  relaxes  the  private  sector  budget  constraint
and  increases  domestic  assets  demands  and  private  investment.  Note that  the
positive  short-run  effect  on the  production  level  is  relatively  weak because
the  short-run  link  between  public  investment  and  production  is  negative  due to
the  existence  of adjustment  costs.  However,  as the  costs  of adjustment
disappear,  the increase  in  the  GDP  level  becomes  progressively  higher  over
time.  To illustrate,  the  estimated  total  impact  of a 20 % debt-reduction  is
1.62  % oni  GDP  growth  for  the  first  year  and 3.60  % for  the fifth  year.  These
simulated  results  are  more  favorable  to  debt-reduction  operations  than  those
obtained  with single-equation  approaches.  Indeed,  the  direct  and the  total
effects  (in  terms  of elasticities)  on private  investment  is 0.124  and 1.129
respectively 29. This  comparison  suggests  that  the  variations  in interest
rates  and  in domestic  credits  constitute  indirect  crucial  channels  through
which  a debt-relief  influences  investment  and  growth  in  Argentina.
27The  decline  in the  price  level  comes  from  the  reduction  in domestic
interest  rates,  thereby  increasing  the  demand  for  national  liquidities  (ml).
28We supposed  that  only  the  public  debt-service  is  reduced  by the  debt-
relief  operation  and, therefore,  there  is  no direct  liquidity  effect  in  the
private  sector.  Furthermore,  we assumed  that  the  public  external  debt-service
is equal  to 5 % of the  total  stock  of debt.  That  means  that the  reduction  in
the  public  debt-service  is :  -dfds 8 =  0.05*(-deD$)
29source:  Schmidt-Hebbel,  1990  p.299,  case  6a.20
We also  simulated  additional  financing  policies  because  they  represent
an alternative  to debt-reduction  operations.  Such  policies  imply  a short-run
liquidity  effect  but  a medium-run  disincentive  effect  due to the  increase  in
the  external  debt stock. As the impact  of such  policies  might  be different
according  to the  use of external  resources,  we distinguished  additional
financing  to the  private  sector  and to  the  public  sectn-o  For  simplicity,  we
assumed  that  debt-service  payments  are  not influenced  by idditional  financing
during  the  first  5 years.  Although  additional  external  financing  to the
private  sector  relaxes  the  private  sector  budget  constraint,  this  policy  does
not lead  to an increase  in  private  investment.  The strong  total  negative
impact  on private  investment  is  mainly  explained  by the  fact  that  new  foreign
resources  will be  used to finance  capital  flight  rather  than productive
investment  in  the  case  of Argentina.  To the  opposite  of most studies  on the
relationships  between  external  capital  and  economic  growth,  the  model  does  not
assume  that  external  funds  will  be automatically  used  to finance  productive
investment.  In addition,  the  decrease  in  private  investment  is  accentuated
through  the  rise  in interest  rates  and in  the  stock  of external  debt
(disincentive  effect)  and through  the  reduction  in  the level  of production.
Finally,  new financing  to the  government  contributes  to an increase  in
public  investment  and  to a reduction  in borrowing  from the  Central  Bank  which,
in  turn,  leads  to an increase.  in  domestic  credits  to the  private  sector.  These
variations  affect  the  GDP  level  positively  in tli'  short-run,  but this  positive
effect  gradually  diminishes  in  subsequent  years.  In spite  of the  dynamic
structure  of the  model,  additional  external  resources  conduct  to  an increase
in  the stock  of external  debt  which  affects  negatively  private  investment  when
the initial  liquidity  effect  becomes  progressively  weaker.  It is  noteworthy
that such  policy  does  not imply  a shift  in the  portfolio  of private  agents
from  foreign  assets  into  domestic  assets  and productive  investment.  Rather,  as
the  changes  in the  private  sector  behavior  are  mainly  due  to the increase  in
the  flow supply  of credit,  the impact  of such  policy  on capital  flight  is
significantly  positive.
3.  A POLICY  IMPLICATION  :  THE EFFICIENT  USE  OF INTERNATIONAL  RESOURCES  IN  A
DEBT-REDUCTION  PROGRAM
The  simulation  results  presented  in the  last  section  emphasize  the
effects  of debt  write-off  and  additional  financing  operations  on Argentina's
economy.  Similarly,  the  macroeconomic  framework  can  be  used to evaluate  the
implications  of more realistic  policies.  In  particular,  we will consider  the
case  where the  International  Financial  Institutions  make available  some  loans
to  Argentina  for  debt-reduction.  Because  the  new foreign  funds  may  be used to
finance  domestic  activities  as  well as debt-reduction  operations,  it is
necessary  to determine  the  debt-reduction  and  liquidity  combination  which  fits
the  best  with  the  preferences  of commercial  creditors  and  the  debtor  country.
According  to this  combination  we will  estimate  the  impact  of such  operation  on
Argentina's  growth.
By introducing  the  macroeconomic  model  used in the  last  section  into  the21
microeconomic  analysis  proposed  by Claessens  and  Diwan (1990)30,  we will
determine  empirically  the liquidity  and  debt-reduction  combination  which
leaves  the  commercial  creditors  indifferent  to the status  quo and  maximizes
Argentina's  GDP. Since  the  approach  presented  below  is an illustration  of the
Claessens  and  Diwan's  model,  the  description  of it  will be brief.  We prefer  to
focus  on the empirical  results.
Since  debt-reduction  as well  as new  money  instruments  are  negotiated
simultaneously  in the  Brady  Plan,  the  following  budget  constraint  can  be
written:
(38)  f + n =(eOD 8) +  q[DR  + n +  fl
where  f is the  new loan  made  available  by the  International  Financial
Institutions,  O(eOD 8) the  new liquidity  used  by the  government  for  domestic
purposes,  q the  ex-ante  price  of debt  on the  secondary  market,  DR the  net
debt-reduction  and  n the  extra  new  money  provides  by commercial  banks 31.
The budget  constraint  (38)  states  that  new foreign  funds  (f  +  n) can  be
used  by the  government  to finance  domest4-  activities  or debt-reduction
through  buyback  where  the  buyback  price  is  assumed  to be the  ex-ante  price
32 q.
In order  to  assure  that  the  remaining  commercial  banks  do not lose
compared  to the  status  quo  situation,  Claessens  and  Diwan  assume  that the
extra  new  money  provided  by these  banks  is equal  to the  capital  gain  on their
remaining  exposure.  Thus:
(39)  (1  - pdebt)n  - (pdebt  - q)[(OeDS$l)  - DR - n - f]
with  0  - commercial  external  debt/total  external  debt
The  variable  pdebt  is  defined  as  the  ex-post  price  of  debt  on  the
secondary  market.  Since  several  empirical  studies  indicated  a negative  and
significant  relationship  between  the  secondary  market  price  of debt  and  the
face  value  of debt (see  Claessens  and  Diwan  for  a summary),  we consider  the
following  relationship  :
(40)  pdebt  - po  +  pl(eD$/y)  +  p2(eD$/x)
30This  section  can  be view as  an attempt  to reconcile  our  macroeconomic
framework  with the  microeconomic  arguments  proposed  in  the  recent  literature.
31The  net debt-reduction  is  defined  as the  gross  debt-reduction  minus  the
funds  made available  by the  commercial  banks  and  the  IFI (f+n).
32For  simplification,  we assume  here that  all  debt-reduction  occurs
through  buyback.  But,  the  analysis  can  be easily  extended  to exit  bonds  (see
Claessens  and  Diwan).22
with  po = 0.32857 ,  p,  = -0.181161  and  P2  - -0.0010624
Note that  we used  for the  parameters  Pa  and  p2 the  values  estimated  by
Boehmer  and  Megginson  (1990)  and  for  the intercept  po  the  value  which  assures
an initial  price  of debt  equal  to 0.20  dollar  which  is  approximately  the  price
of Argentina's  debt  on the  secondary  market  at the  beginning  of 1991.
For simplification,  we suppose  that  the  debtor  country's  main objective
is to maximize  its  GDP  level.  As an illustration,  let  us assume  that  the
utility  function  can  be represented  by the  following  function:
(41)  u(y)  - u(DR,  eOD 5) - DR*eOD.a
with  a  - 0.041  and  I  =  0.023
where  a  and I  are  the  elasticities  of Y with  respect  to DR  and eOD 5
respectively.  Since  the  response  of GDP  to debt-reduction  and additional
financing  have  been simulated  in section  2, we used  the  estimated  parameters
presented  in table  5. Note  that  the  value  of the  parameter  a  reflects  the
impact  of a debt-reduction  on GDP  without  liquidity  effect  (first  column  of
Table  5).
In order  to determine  the  optimal  combination  of debt-reduction  and
liquidity,  we maximize  the  utility  function  (41)  subject  to the  constraints
(38),  (39)  and (40).  Graphically,  this  maximization  problem  is illustrated  in
figure  1. Substituting  equations  (40)  and (39)  into  (38),  we get the  curve  AA'
which  represents  the  combinations  of debt-reduction  and liquidity  for  a given
amount  of loans  f and  a given  buyback  price  q. The  utility  function  (41)  is
illustrated by the  curve  BB'. Since  the  curve  MA'  represents  the set  of
deals  that leaves  remaining  bank  creditors  indifferent,  the  debtor  country
will choose  from these  possible  combinations  the  debt-reduction  and liquidity




We present  in  Table  6 the  optimal  combinations  of debt-reduction  and23
liquidity  for different  loans  make available  by the  International  Financial
Institutions  to  Argentlna.  Note  that  the  buyback  price  is  US$  0.20  which is
approximately  the  prlce  of  Argentina's  debt  on the  secondary  market  at -he
beginning  of 1991.  On the  whole,  the  results  are  encouraging.  For instance,  a
US$ 3.2  billion  loan  from  the  International  Financial  Institutions  leads  to  an
1.58  % lncrease  in  GDP  growth  and  the  ex-post  price  rises  to 0.227  dollar,  a
2.27  cents  gain  compared  to the  lnltial  price.  The  positive  impact  on GDP is
quLte  significant  slnce  average  GDP growth  has  been only  0.05%  over the  1982-
88 period  ln  Argentina.  Also,  thls  can  be compared  to the  effects  of the  1989
debt-reduction  program  ln  Mexico 33. In  a recent  paper,  Van  Wijnbergen  (1990)
evaluated  that  the  total  impact  of the  1989  debt-reductlon  package  on Mexico's
growth  performance  will  be 1 percentage  point  initially,  and  around  2
percentage  point  after  6 years.  But,  these  results  include  both the  incentlve
effect  and  the liquidity  effect  through  the  reduction  in external  debt-
service.  If we take  into  account  only the  lncentive  effect,  the  Van
Wijnbergen's  estimates  are  approximately  0.4  % for  the  first  year  and 1  % for
the  sixth  year  vhile  our results  for  Argentina  are 1.58%  and 1.81  %
respectively.
In summary,  the  results  presented  in this  section  suggest  that  a debt-
reduction  program  financed  by forelgn  resources  can  be quite  successful  to
restore  investment  and  growth  in the  case  of Argentina.  However,  such
empirical  result  should  be interpreted  with caution.  Indeed,  the  analysis
supposes,  beyond  the  limits  of the  macroeconomic  model,  that  the  remaining
commercial  creditors  are indifferent  compared  to the  status  quo  situation  and
that  Argentina  would  make  an efficient  use  of the  new loans  made available  by
the  International  Financial  Institutions.
4. CONCLUSION
An analytical  framework  has  been developed  for  examining  the
implications  of debt-reduction  operations  for  the  economy  of a typical  middle-
income  heavily  indebted  country.  Although  the  model  has  been estimated  and
simulated  for  Argentina,  it is  quite  apparent  that it is  a specification  that
is readily  to be applied  to  other  developing  countries.  It could  be clearly  of
interest  in some  future  work  to extend  our  analysis  to include  data  from  other
countries  as  well.
The  general  conclusion  that  emerges  is  that  debt-reduction  policies  can
be quite  successful  to restore  investment  and,  consequently,  growth  in debtor
countries.  Indeed,  such  policies  combine  a liquidity  effect  resulting  from  the
reduction  in  debt-  ervice  payments  and  an incentive  effect  resulting  from  the
debt-relief.  To illustrate,  the simulatLon  results  indicate  that,  in the  case
of Argentina,  the  positive  effect  of 30  % debt-reduction  is 2.43%  and  5.40  %
33A  US$ 3.2  billions  loan  to  Argentina  represents  approximately  3.5  % of
its  1988  GDP. To compare,  the  funds  made  available  by the International
Financial  Institutions  to Mexico  in  1989  were about  US$ 5.3  billions  which
represented  3.3%  of its  1988  GDP.24
on  the  GDP  level  in  the  first  year  and  in  the  fifth  year  respectively.
Because,  the  liquidity  effect  should  be  limited  at  least  in  the  short-run  in
countries  like  Argentina 34, it  is  noteworthy  that  the  model  emphasizes
potentially  Important  and  significant  incentive  effects  of  debt-reduction
programs.  The  model  identifles  various  channels  through  which  a  reduction  l.n
foreign  debt  influences  investment  and,  in  the  process,  highlights  that,
although  the  direct  effect  of  debt-relief  on  private  investment  is  relatively
weak,  the  indirect  effects  through  domestic  assets  demands  are  strong.  The
prospect  of  higher  stability  in  the  domestic  economy  increases  the  demand  for
domestic  assets  and,  in  particular,  the  demand  for  bank  deposits.  This  reduces
domestic  interest  rates  and  raises  the  supply  of  credits  extended  by  the
domestic  financial  sector.  Both  effects  influence  positively  productive
investment.  The  indirect  effect  through  the  domestic  credit  market  relies  on
the  well-known  McKinnon-Shaw  arguments  that  state  a  positive  relationship
between  money  and  productive  capital  in  most  developing  countries.
Although  the  model  used  in  this  paper  can  be  improved  in  many  ways,
e.g.,  debt-service  payments  might  be  endogenous  and  the  production  function  is
simple,  we  attempt  in  the  last  part  of  the  paper  to  determine  how  should  be
used  an  eventual  loan  from  the  International  Financial  Institutions  to
Argentina.  By  introducing  our  macroeconomic  framework  into  the  microeconomic
approach  proposed  by  Claessens  and  Diwan  (1990),  we  calculated  the  debt-
reduction  and  liquidity  combination  which  maximizes  Argentina's  GDP  and  leaves
the  remaining  commercial  banks  indifferent  compared  to  the  status  quo.  The
empirical  results  suggest  that  a  Brady  Plan  operation  can  establish  the  basis
for  sustainable  growth  in  Argentina.  This  conclusion  is  of  course  tentative
because  there  is  need  for  much  more  detailed  research  between  external  debt,
investment  and  growth.
34In the  medium-run,  we  can  assume  that  improvement  in  country
creditworthiness  generated  by  the  debt-reduction  would  help  attract  additional
foreign  loans  and  direct  investment.25
Table  1:
Expected  Signs  of the  Parameters
Yd  Xm  ib  eD$/P
cp*  Q11> 0 a02>O  013>0  a14>0  a15>°
ml*  021>0  C22<O  a23<0  a24<0  025>0
v*  031>0  032<0  033>0  C34<0  35<0
b*  N41>0  042<0  C43<0  C44>0  C45<0
k*p  1  a51>0  oSa>O  a53<0  054<0  a55<0
Table  2 :
The  Impact  of a Simple  Debt-Reduction  and  an Increase  in Foreinn  Capital
Inflow  on  Main  Macroeconomic  Variables
- d(eDSg-1)  <  0  d(eOD$p) > 0
y  +  +
ip  +  +
ig  +  0
OR$  +  +or-
aLg
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(t-statistics  are in  parenthesis)
(12)  cp =  -0.001  +  0.537Yd - 0.306(10-4)1r  +  0.543(10- 4)im  +
(-0.40)  (11,99)  (-6.29)  (5. 64)
0.059e8D$p/P  - 0.134OLp/P  +  O.020eD$/P  +  0.356cp.l
(0.22)  (-1.03)  (2.97)  (4.48)
R2 _  0.971,  DW  =  2.01
(14)  tVd  =  -0.011  +  0.288Yd  - 0.674(10  5)ir  +  0.409(10  5)im  +
(-6.46)  (10.76)  (-2.29)  (0.73)
0.639eL)D$P/P  +  0.354OLd/P  - 0.lOleD$/P  - 1.060v- 1
(3.74)  (3.71)  (-5.24)  (-0.63)
0.051duml
(4.35)  R2 =  0.973,  DW  - 2.30
(16)  ip  =  -0.025  +  0.037(Y/YT)  +  0.109(10  4)7r  - 0.302(10-4)im  -
(-5.30)  (7.65)  (3.91)  (-5.10)
0.466OeD$/P  +  0.491eLp/P  - 0.091eD$/P  - 0.006k-,
(-3.67)  (4.74)  (-3.99)  (-0.64)
R2  = 0.897,  DV =  2.08
(15') t  - -40.469  +  0.539p  +  18.1596i,  +  0. 466 ff +  36.882(p/pf)-l
(-1.34)  (12.23)  (2.89)  (14.33)  (1.29)
- 31.674dum2  R2 =  0.994,  DV - 1.77
(-3.61)
(18)  x  -0.008  +  9.421(eP*/P)  +  0.013k..  +  0.049ay  +  0.45x-.
(-1.75)  (3.20)  (2.72)  (1.34)  (3.25)
+  0.005dum3  R2 - 0.896,  DV  - 2.48
(2.54)
(22)  is  - -0.002  - 0.465ibB-l/P  - 0.487fds,  +  0.294eOD$8/P
(-1.37)  (-2.09)  (-3.06)  (1.90)
+  0.0 38y-I  +  0.874i 8 1 R2 -0.883,  DV  - 2.13
(2.06)  (4.93)
(26)  y3  - 0.023 +  1.596ip  - 0.709i8  +  0.243k-I  - 0.028dum4
(5.05)  (2.55)  (-0.60)  (12.07)  (-5.73)
+  0.Olldum5  - 0.035dum6  R2 - 0.921,  DV - 1.81
(2.17)  (-5.17)27
Table  4:
Comparison  between  Historic  and  Simulated  Series  (1962-86)
VarLables  correlation  coefficient  Theil's  coefficient
0.829  0.323
cp  0.915  0.079
lp  0.752  0.266
ig  0.937  0.108
x  0.932  0.110
y  0.873  0.098
ff  0.997  0.053
o0  0.679  0.794
OLp  0.904  0.361
table  5:
Simulation  Results  for  External  Financing  Policies  on Domestic  Variables
Deviations  from Baseline  in terms  of Elasticity
|  |  debt-reduction  |  debt-reduction  I additional  financin8  i  additional  financing  I
without  liquidity  I  with  liquidity  I  to the  private  I  to the  public
effect  I  effect  I  sector  I  sector
F  ~~~~~~~~~~~~I  _.  . I  ....  ... 
I  I lyear  5  syearsa r  year  years  I year  5  years  I  year  5  years
____t----  - 1  --  --  - !
Iip  1  0.476  0.584  1.129  2.159  -0.928  -0.097  0  397  0.210
is  I  0  0.208  1  0.725  3.134  I  0  -0.132  1  0.475  0.369
cp  I  0.018  0.022  1  -0.0054 -0.055  I  -0.037 -0.001  1  -0.017  -0.003  1
I  Cj  I  -1.088 -1.006  1  -0.960  -0.463  I  0.313 -0.001  1  0.152  0.057  I
y  1  0.041  0.058  1  0.081  0.180  I  -0.081 -0.011  1  0.023  0.022  I
Cv  1  0.004  0.008  1  0.022  0.046  1  -0.005 -0.005  I  0.011  0.009
i  1  -0.047 -0.112  1  -0.266  -0.678  1  0.064  0.031  1  -0.140  -0.07  I
a  I  -0.028 -0.008  1  -0.158  -0.054  1  0.038  0.002  1  -0.083  -0.004  1
Olp I  -0.505 -0.491  1  -0.514  -0.547  1  0.034  0.008  1  0.0255  -0.013  1
bLg I  0  -0.177  1  -0.653  -1.486  1  0  -0.113  1  -0.973  0.315  1
1OR/PI  0.936  0.875  1  1.120  0.716  1  0.068 -0.006  1  0.184  -0.038  I
Calculated  with 1986  values
Table  6:
The  optimal  debt-reduction  liquidity  combination
(S  billion,  unless  otherwise  indicated)
f  0.6  1  3.2  5
n  i  0.164  0.237  0.463  0.423
pdebt  |  20.507  20.77  22.31  23.35
DR  i  2.072  3.166  9.438  13.690
O(OD$g)o  0.232  0.355  1.059  1.536
y  (%)  R  0.347  0.531  1.582  2.300
Note :  q-0.20,  * - 0.54728
Appendix  1:
Definition  and  Data  Sources
The  basic  sources  for  the  data  used in this  study  are  International
Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  published  by the  International  Monetary  Fund  and
the  Statistical  Appendix  of the  World  Bank  Country  Study :"Argentina  :  Reforms
for  Price  Stability  and  Growth"  (WB).  These  sources  was  augmented,  when
necessary,  by data from  the Central  Bank  of Argentina  (BCRA),  the  "Fundaccion
Meditarranea"  (FM),  FIEL  and  Dornbusch  and  de Pablo's  study :  "Debt  and
Macroeconomic  Instability  in  Argentina"  (DP).  All  real  variables  have  been
deflated  by the  WPI index  (1970-100).
We present  in  Table  6 the  complete  model  used  for  Argentina  and the
definitions  of the  variables  used in  this  paper  with  the source  of data  where
relevant.  Note,  as described  in section  2.1,  that  there  are some  differences
between  the  general  framework  proposed  in section  1  and the  model  estimated
for  Argentina.  In particular,  the  private  sector  does  not  hold  public  bonds
and the  interest  rate  on public  bonds  is implicitely  determined  through  the
bank  deposits  markets.  These  both  assumptions  are  explained  in  details  in
appendix  2.  Also  we prefered  to  estimate  the inflation  rate (equation  15')
directly  rather  than  estimate  the  demand  for  money (equation  15).  Finally,
discrepancies  in the  data  prevailed  to apply  to  Argentina  a consistency
approach  for  the  public  and  the  financial  sector  budget  constraints.
Table  6 :
The  Complete  Model aBnlied  to  Argentina  and  Definition  of  Variables
Behavioral  Eauations
Private  Consumotion
CP-  c10  + 
6 llYd  +  12r  +  113im +  1 15(eD$/P)  +  1 1 6 (pfyP)  +  127(eOD$p/P)  +  118cp-1
Inflation
ir - ro  +  r?jS + 72 0im  + r3irf  + r4(P/pf)-1  - r5dum2
Bank  DeBosits  demand
d  *  o30  +  131Yd +  32'r  + & 33i,  + £ 35(eD$/P)  + 136(OLp/P)  + A 3 7(eOD8 $p/P)  + 138v-1 +
9 39 duml
Private  Investment
ip  - Aso  +  B51(Y/YT)  +  £52 r  +  £ 5 3im  +  955(eD$/P)  + £56(OLp/P)  +  A57(eOD$p/P)  +
158kp-l
Exports
x  - e 0 + e1(eP*/P)  + e2k-1 + 93ay  +  84x 1 +  95dum3
Public  Investment
is  =  TO  +  vl(ibB-1/P)  +  r 2 (fds.)  +  r3 (eOD 8
8 /P)  Ty  r4Y-1  r5 ig-129
Output
yS  nO  +  olip  +  n2ig  +  0 3k-1 +  f4dum4  +  05dum5  +  i 6dum6
Identities  :
Disposable  income
Yd  =  Y - A
where A =  t + (im  - Ir)(V. 1/P) + (ib  - n)(B1/P) - (i 1 - 7r)(Lp-./P)  - fdsp
Domestic  Credit  to the  Private  Sector
OLp  =  tM1 5 + cVs  - rB  - eOR$ -6L  - Z
where Z  =  (im  - ir)V-l  +  (i 1 - ?r)L-l  +  (if  - 1r  - eA)eR$.j  +  i(B- 1)
Capital  Flight
ebJ 5/P  =  Yd  +  (OLp  + e6D3p)/P  - cp - ip  - rml - Ov
Variation  in InternatAR
ional  Reserves
eOR$/P  =  [ebD$p  +  ebD3 8 - eOJ6]/P  +  [x  - u]
where u =  im + fdsp  + fdsg - (if  - I  - eA)eRS.]
Arrears
arrears =  (if - I  - eA)eD3  - (fdsp  + fdsg)
Domestic  credit  to the  Rublic  sector
OLg/P +  rBs/P =  ig  +  (ib - ir)B- 1/P + fds8 + oi
where  oi  =  g +  (ij  - w)Lg-1/P  - eODD 3 - t
Flow supply  of  money
rm  =  (&M 1)
Bank  deposits  market  equilibrium
Vs/P =  v-.  + rvd
Stock  of capital
k - (1  - 6)k-1 +  ip +  is
Price  level
P  =  (1  +  7r)P. 1
Stock  of  external  Debt
eD$  =  eD 3 P'  + erD$p  +  eD$9 1 + eOD$,  + arrears
Definition
eOJ$  Capital  flight,  calculated  as  (OeD$+FDI+CA-OR)30
Yd  Real disposable  income,  calculated  as (8m1+Ov+Oj+cP+iP-6lP-e8D$P/P)
eTB  Trade  balance,  IFS  line  77acd
cp  Real private  consumption,  IFS  line  96f
Omld  Real  money  demand  (flow),  IFS  line  34 (changes)
ov  Real  bank deposits  demand  (flow),  IFS  line 35 (changes)
Obd  Real  public  bonds  demand  (flow)
ip  Real  private  investment,  IFS lines  93e  and 93i
dLp  Variation  in  domestic  credit  to the  private  sector,  IFS line  32d
(changes)
eOR 3 Variation  in international  reserves,  IFS  line  79cd
arrears  Interest  arrears  on foreign  debt,  World  Debt  Tables  (1990)
OVS  Flow supply  of bank  deposits,  IFS  line  35 (changes)
im  Nominal  interest  rate  on deposits,  CB
OLg  Variation  in domestic  credits  to the  public  sector,  WB and  FM
ig  Real public  investment,  WB and  FIEL
OBs  Flow supply  of public  bonds,  WB and  FM
ib  Nominal  interest  rate  on bonds
yS  Real aggregate  supply,  IFS  line  99b
k  Real stock  of capital,  FM
iT  Domestic  inflation  rate,  WB
P  Domestic  price  level  (WPI  index),  WB
Ml  Stock  of money,  IFS  line  34
B  Stock  of public  bonds
eDt  Stock  of external  debt,  World  Debt  Tables  and CB
ebD$p  Variation  in  external  credit  to the  private  sector,  calculates  as
OeD$b-  OeD$,
ebD$,  Variation  in  external  credit  to the  public  sector,  WB
e  Nominal  exchange  rate,  IFS  line  wf
W*  Imported  foreign  inflation  rate,  WB
G  Public  consumption
t  Fiscal  Revenues
x  Exports,  WB
im  Imports,  WB
it  external  debt  interest  rate
fdsp  Interest  paid  on foreign  debt  by the  private  sector
fdsg  Interest  paid  on foreign  debt  by the  public  sector
P*  foreign  GDP deflator  (US)
oM1  Flow supply  of money  (Ml)
p  Rate  of growth  of money  (/M/M)
A  t  +  (im  - w)(V- 1/P)  +  (ib  - Ir)(B- 1/P) - (ij  - ir)(L'p_./P)  - fdsp,
calculated  as  y  yd
Z  (i, - ir)V-l  +  (iL  - r)L- 1 +  (if  - ff  - eA)eR$-i  +  i(B- 1), calculated
as  OM18  + OVs  OB - eOR$  -L4  - OLp
u  im +  fdsp  +  fdsg - (if  - i  - eA)eRS  l,  calculated as [eOD$P  +  eOD$ 8 -
eOJ$]/P  +  x  - eOR$/P
oi  g +  (is  - iT)L8_/P  - eODD,  - t,  calculated  as  OL./P  +  OB6/P - ig -
(ib  - ir)B-./P  - fds 5
pdebt  Ex-post  price  of debt  on the  secondary  market
q  Buyback price
f  Loan  make available  by the  International  Financial  Institutions
n  New  money31
DR  Net Debt-reduction
0  commercial  debt/total  external  debt,  World  Debt  Tables  (1990)
APPENDIX  2:
In this  appendix  we present  the  financial  sector  budget  constraint,
assuming  that  all  public  bonds  are  held  by this sector.  The  nominal  budget
constraint  of the  Central  Bank is :
(1)  CMI  +  (OBB)  +  (reserves)  + (i - w)(Lg_1)  + (it  - ff)(eR*-l)  - (ib  - ir)(BB- 1)  -
(0L1)  +  e6R$B
where  reserves  are  the  commercial  banks  reserves,  OM1 the  supply  of currency,
OBO  the  remunerated  reserves  in forms  of forced  investment  or central  bank
bonds,  OL 5 the  credits  from  the  Central  Bank  to the  public  sector  and  e6R 3B
the international  reserves  held  by the  Central  Bank.
The  nominal  budget  constraint  of the  commercial  banks  is
(2)  OV + (i - ff)(Lp,I)  +  (ib  - if)(BB- 1)  + (ib - ff)(B-1)  - (im  - ir)(V- 1) + (if  -
ir)(R$b-.1)  - 0LD  +  OBB  + OB  + eOR$ + (reserves)
where  OV is  the  supply  of banks  deposits,  OL,  the  domestic  credit  to  the
private  sector,  OB the  bonds  issued  by the  government  and  eORSb  the
international  reserves  held by the  commercial  banks.
Substituting  equation  (2)  into  (1),  we get  the  budget  constraint  of the
financial  sector  :
ONI3M  +  OV"  - (i.  - w)V_1 +  (i  - r  + (i  - ir)L,_1 +  (if  - X  - eA  )eR$_ 1 +
ib(B-l)  - OLL  + OB + e6R 5 1  8L 5
where  e0R$  - eoR$B  + eoR$b
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